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Literature and Libel*




The subject of defamation has engaged the attention of An-
glo-American courts for hundreds of years.1 The overwhelm-
ing majority of the cases have involved communications that
purported to be true but which the plaintiffs alleged were false
and defamatory.2 Only recently has attention been drawn to
the problem of defamation in communications that purport to
be fictitious.' It is fair to say that this interest has developed
from a few unusual lawsuits4 rather than as a logical progres-
sion from actions against communications that purport to be
true. In this article we discuss briefly the historical treatment
of defamation in the area of fiction, inquire whether fiction
* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 28th Annual Program,
Legal Aspects of the Entertainment Industry, Fictional Characters and Real People,
April 24, 1982 (co-sponsored by the Beverly Hills Bar Association and the University of
Southern California Law Center).
** Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Stanford University; A.B. 1953, LL.B.
1956, Cornell University.
*** Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1972; J.D., Stanford University, 1982.
1. See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3, at 4-8 (1978).
2. See Franklin, Suing Mediafor Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FouND.
RESEARCH J. 795; Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Liti-
gation, 1980 AM. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 455.
3. The question would not arise if authors conscientiously avoided giving nega-
tive attributes to fictional characters, but such an ultimate interference with creativity
is violative of the First Amendment. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-
48 (1974) (which "shield[s] the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict
liability for defamation . . .where . . .the substance of the defamatory statement
'makes substantial danger to reputation apparent' "). One concern is that authors, par-
ticularly those writing first novels, frequently use autobiographical material, thus
"lean Iing] heavily on the author's (usually unflattering) portrayal of and judgment on
his family." See H. PILPEL & T. ZAVIN, RIGHTS AND WRITERS: A HANDBOOK OF LITERARY
AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW 23 (1960).
4. E.g., Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., C. 79-251 (D. Wyo. Feb. 20, 1981),
appealfiled, No. 81-1480 (10th Cir. 1981); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155
Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
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needs more protection than the common law now affords it and
explore the implications for fiction of recent constitutional
developments regarding defamation in nonfiction
communications.5
We define fiction to include any communication in which the
author explicitly or implicitly indicates that some or all of the
information should not be taken literally.' Even with this ex-
pansive definition of "fiction," we have identified only twenty-
five fiction-defamation cases.7 Analyzing them either by chron-
5. Our concern primarily will be with the author, although in almost all fiction-
defamation cases the publisher is the sole defendant or is joined as a defendant.
It is possible for the author and publisher to be found differentially liable in a defa-
mation action. For instance, in Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), the author was found to have acted with actual malice.
The publisher was found not to have acted maliciously in printing the hardback edi-
tion, but to have so acted when it licensed paperback reprint rights after being notified
by plaintiffs attorney that certain material in the novel was defamatory. Also, in Corri-
gan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 56, 126 N.E. 260 (1920), the author, whom the court
found intended to defame the plaintiff, was not a party to the action. The publisher did
not have such intent, though an employee of the publisher, acting in a private capacity,
may have known of the author's intention.
6. Our concern is only with defamation suits arising from the parts of the commu-
nication claiming to be fictitious.
Several definitions of fiction have been used by commentators discussing defama-
tion actions. One suggested, 'The test ... is whether the written piece purports to be
factual, with the goal of informing, as opposed to fictional, with the goal of enlightening
or commenting upon some aspect of the human experience ... A reasonableness test
should be employed ... " For "faction," see infra, the posited test was "whether a
reasonable person of average literary sophistication would consider it fiction." Com-
ment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for Absolute First Amendment Protection, 29
Am. U.L. REV. 571, 592-93 (1980). Another, contending that "[tihe central issue that
must be determined is whether the allegedly defamatory work is fiction, or reportage
thinly disguised as fiction," Wilson, The Law of Libel and the Art of Fiction, 44 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. -, - [at n.128], found that the determination can be made
"only ... by the writer's statement and the critics' opinions." Id. at - [at n.133].
In addition to the obvious cases of conventional fiction, we include communications
that purport to be accurate in most respects, e.g., a newspaper article stating, "This
story is entirely true, except that the names of certain people have been changed."
See, e.g., Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975), affid,
535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff, whose name was used inadvertently in a newspa-
per story purportedly true except for use of allegedly "fictitious" names, failed to prove
"of and concerning" element of defamation case). A case arising from the use of a
purportedly false name would be within the scope of this article; a defamation case
arising from an aspect of the article that the reporter asserted was true would not.
A new fiction genre, sometimes called "faction," see Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths"
of Art, and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1065 (1978), uses names of famous
people, many of whom are still living, but asserts it is placing them in fictitious situa-
tions. Faction requires special consideration and is discussed at text accompanying
notes 91-99, infra.
7. In addition to those cases otherwise cited herein, fiction-defamation cases in-
clude Blake v. Hearst Publications, 75 Cal. App. 2d 6, 170 P.2d 100 (1946); Callahan v.
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ological order8 or by type of medium9 elicits no clear decisional
pattern. Nor do we find a line of satisfactory analysis running
through the cases. Rather, we find judicial "intuition" gener-
ally correct; that is, money from damage awards changes hands
in defensible directions' ° despite the unpersuasive and incon-
sistent rationales used. Our proposed approach will not
change many results in the fiction-defamation cases, but will
allow authors and publishers to know what duties they have to
those who claim to be identified in and defamed by fictional
material.
Israels, 140 Misc. 295, 250 N.Y.S. 470 (1931); Dall v. Time, Inc., 252 App. Div. 636, 300
N.Y.S. 680 (1937), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 635, 16 N.E.2d 297 (1938); Merle v. Sociological Re-
search Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915); Youssoupoff v. Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934), sub nom. Alexandrovna (Princess)
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 78 Sol. J. 617 (1934).
8. Of the fiction-defamation cases decided before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), defendants were successful in defending against or having dismis-
sed five defamation actions, while plaintiffs were awarded damages or withstood de-
fendants' motions in ten actions. After New York Times, the comparable figures were
four for defendants and six for plaintiffs.
9.
Number of cases in
which plaintiff
successfully Number of cases in
withstands which defendant
Medium containing defendant's motions successfully defends
allegedly defamatory or is awarded against action or has
fictional material damages it dismissed
Books 6 6*




*Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962) involved as
defendants the book publisher and motion picture distributor and thus is
counted twice.
10. The damage awards, however, ought not always be for defamation. In some
cases, discussed infra, the more appropriate action might have been for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, e.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980); E.
Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20, or breach of contract, e.g., Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92
Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979). Or a case such as
Bindrim might be seen as a small damage award for defamation and a larger award for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See also Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co.,
82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936) (optical illusion in photograph depicting plaintiff with grotes-
quely enlarged genitalia was defamatory).
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II
Defamation in Fiction at Common Law
A. "Of and Concerning"
Common law courts never set fiction cases aside for special
treatment when the plaintiff sued for defamation." Rather, the
courts used the same elements they used in non-fiction cases-
false statement of and concerning plaintiff that hurts his repu-
tation and causes the required type of damage-though some
elements loomed larger because of the different issues
involved.
In traditional defamation cases involving nonfiction commu-
nications, the plaintiff must establish as one element of the ac-
tion that the communication was "of and concerning" him.'2
This element was given the name "colloquium"' 3 and generally
has not been very difficult for plaintiffs to prove in nonfiction
cases. In most instances, the statement clearly is about the
plaintiff, and the concerns are whether it is defamatory and
what defenses might be applicable.
In common law defamation cases involving fiction, however,
the central problem has been to show that the article or state-
ment was "of and concerning" the plaintiff.'4 This element is
difficult to show because the author has stated explicitly that
11. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Stanley, 56 Ga. App. 85, 192 S.E. 300
(1937) (otherwise innocent words or pictures may be shown to be defamatory by collo-
quium and inducement, and by extraneous facts to libel plaintiff); Brown v. Paramount
Publix Corp., 240 App. Div. 520, 270 N.Y.S. 544 (1934) (court applied common law ele-
ments of defamation in action involving fictionalized motion picture account of real
murder).
12. See, e.g., Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966) (plaintiff able
to show the defamatory depiction of fictional character was "of and concerning" plain-
tiff); Allen v. Gordon, - A.D.2d -, 446 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1982) (plaintiff unable to show book
was "of and concerning" him despite being only psychiatrist surnamed "Allen" in
Manhatten, thus having same surname, profession and professional location as
fictional character). See also Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 232, 267-69 (1965).
13. See W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 111, at 746-49 (4th ed. 1971). Modern
practice in most states no longer requires pleading extrinsic facts to prove identifica-
tion, see, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAw § 3016(a) (Consol. 1974). Some jurisdictions are con-
tra, see, e.g., Velle Transcendental Ass'n, Inc. v. Esquire, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 799, 354
N.E.2d 622 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1951) (judg-
ment for defendant affirmed despite several similarities between plaintiff and charac-
ter in motion picture, including same name). Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn.
1947) (inadvertent use of plaintiff's name and occupation not actionable where dissim-
ilarities existed between plaintiff and character and where defendant did not intend to
describe plaintiff).
No. 2] LITERATURE AND LIBEL
the material is fictitious or because the context suggests that it
should not be taken literally.
The common law courts responded to this situation by devel-
oping a test that asked whether the "reasonable reader" would
understand the fictional material to be "of and concerning" the
plaintiff.'" It was never sufficient for the plaintiff to show that
readers saw similarities between the character and the plain-
tiff' 6 -even the same name*V--and thought that a remarkable
coincidence had occurred.
Plaintiff had to show not only that readers saw strong simi-
larities between the fictional character and the plaintiff, but
that readers came to understand that the material was, in fact,
about the actual plaintiff despite any assertions by the author
that the material was fiction and not based on any particular
human being.'8 This test placed a heavy burden on the plain-
tiff. To show that reasonable readers disregarded the author's
assertion and treated the material as though it were about the
plaintiff, the plaintiff was required to present a substantial dis-
play of similarity between the character and himself.'9 The de-
fendant attempted to counter this by pointing to substantial
dissimilarities which might serve to negate identification in the
minds of the reasonable reader.2 °
15. See, e.g., Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969)
(character could not reasonably be understood to be "of and concerning" plaintiff al-
though defendant used plaintiff's middle name and shortened version of last name and
defendant knew plaintiff); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29,
39, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979) ('The test is whether a reasonable person, reading
the book, would understand that the fictional character therein pictured was, in actual
fact, the plaintiff acting as described.").
16. See, e.g., Allen v. Gordon, - A.D.2d -, 446 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947).
18. See, e.g., Brindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 984 (1979); Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980).
19. See, e.g., Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966) (plaintiff had
cause of action where defendant published novel written by plaintiff's brother contain-
ing defamatory statements about character of same age and same position in family of
identical size as plaintiff's and with some plot elements similar to actual events in
plaintiff's life); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Stanley, 56 Ga. App. 85, 192 S.E. 300 (1937)
(plaintiff had cause of action based on book written by fugitive from chain gang which
allegedly represented plaintiff's participation in transferring convict from prison to
chain gang because convict failed to pay bribe for his release).
20. Some commentators complain that the essence of the fiction case is that the
plaintiff claims that similarities between himself and the character identify him and
the dissimilarities defame him, allowing no defense for the author. See Kalven, The
New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964
SuP. CT. REV. 191, 199 ("First, it is argued that.., a statement referred to the plaintiff;
then, that it falsely ascribed to the plaintiff something that he did not do, which should
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The fiction cases in which the "of and concerning" issue is
central tend to fall into two major categories: first, those in
which the name of the character is identical to the name of the
plaintiff;21 and, second, those in which, although the name is
not identical, the plaintiff claims sufficient external similarities
to justify the identification.22
1. The Same Name Case
Virtually all common law cases have held that it is insuffi-
cient for the plaintiff to show only that his name is the same as
be rather easy to prove about a statement that did not refer to plaintiff in the first
place."); Wilson, supra note 6, at - [n.35] (real persons and events as the "source of
the writer's material ... [are], as well, the source of the art's peculiar vulnerability to
allegations of libel.").
Although there is some validity to this position in the abstract, it appears that in the
specific cases, the plaintiff is concerned that the similarities are obvious to the casual
observer, including such apparent similarities as name, physical appearance, occupa-
tion, residence and family status. If the dissimilarities are equally apparent, such as
different physique or different occupation and residence, those may well help per-
suade the jury that reasonable readers would have considered the array of similarities
and dissimilarities and concluded that it all added up to coincidence.
But most of the cases involve latent dissimilarities, e.g., that a brother left his fa-
ther's deathbed to make money, Felter v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1966); claims that a judge was behaving corruptly, Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228
N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920); or that a therapist engaged in abusive language while con-
ducting a therapy session, Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979). In these situations, it is quite possible for the reasonable
reader to recognize the explicit similarities while not knowing enough about the latent
dissimilarities to reject the identification.
To that extent, then, it seems entirely appropriate that a plaintiff be permitted to
claim that obvious and explicit similarities identify the plaintiff while suing for asser-
tions of defamatory behavior depicted through latent dissimilarities that would not be
apparent to those readers who recognize the similarities.
21. See, e.g., E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [19101 A.C. 20; Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276
(D. Minn. 1947); Polakoff v. Harcourt Brace, 67 A.D.2d 871, 413 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1979) (at-
torney whose name was used in novel for character involved in criminal conspiracy to
assassinate an American general during World War II not entitled to damages for defa-
mation because he could not prove fault on defendant's part).
22. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962) (court
ruled book and movie, which were studies through fiction of actual murder trial and
which attributed unsavory characteristics to fictional victim's widow, would not allow
anyone who knew real widow to associate her with character, despite book and movie
containing several fictional characters admittedly representing real counterparts); Ly-
ons v. New American Library, Inc., 78 App. Div. 2d 723, 432 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1980) (plaintiff
could not prove "of and concerning" despite being sheriff of New York county the
county seat of which is Malone where novel depicted "the Sheriff in Malone" as being
unable to accomplish task requested by other officers); American Broadcasting-Para-
mount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E. 873 (1962) (plaintiff had
cause of action where he was one of two prison guards depicted in television program
which showed one guard, without indicating it was plaintiff, accepting bribe).
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that of a character in the author's purported fiction.23 Ameri-
can courts uniformly have demanded more evidence than the
same name. " How much more has depended on the court,
ranging from one that allowed the plaintiff to present proof of
"of and concerning" when the character's and plaintiff's names
and physical appearances were the same, but dissimilarities
were extreme,25 to those that have held that even a plaintiff
who had more similarities to a fictional character than name
23. The major, perhaps the only, exception is a case that long has been treated as
the leading common law case on the subject. E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20.
There, an article that purported to be a light description of the way Englishmen be-
haved when on vacation on the beaches of France contained a passage that suggested
that "Artemus Jones" was cavorting with a woman who was not his wife. The piece
stated that Artemus Jones was a church warden who lived near Peckham and neces-
sarily was married. Suit was brought by a man named "Artemus Jones." The name
was the only similarity. The dissimilarities were explicit in that the plaintiff was not a
church warden, was not from Peckham and had never been married. Despite the ex-
tent of the dissimilarities, the court allowed a jury to decide whether reasonable read-
ers would understand that the plaintiff was the intended object of the story. A jury
verdict that so found was upheld on appeal, giving rise to the legal maxim that it is not
so much who is aimed at as who is hit. See Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three Conflicting
Judicial Views as to a Question of Defamation, 60 U. PA. L. REV. 365, 461 (1912).
The case is suspect on its asserted rationale, but it does present problems because
there was independent evidence that the plaintiff previously had been connected with
the defendant publication, and that, despite the reporter's testimony that he did not
know of the plaintiff, the name might very well have been chosen as some kind of a
spoof or joke on the plaintiff. Even if this were true, it would go only to the defendant's
intent, and would not provide any basis for supporting a reader identification of the
plaintiff, unless it could be shown (as it was not) that readers knew about the plain-
tiff's prior connection with the newspaper and therefore had greater reason to identify
the plaintiff as the subject of the story.
24. See facts of Smith, supra note 6, and facts of Clare, supra note 14.
25. This case involved "Melanie Geisler," who is described in a novel as a "petite
and attractive young woman, noticeably unconventional in neither conduct nor ap-
pearance," "honey-blonde, 'her body ... firm and compact, though heavier than she
would like.'" Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1980). This character is a
transsexual tennis player involved in a series of dishonest attempts to rig tennis tour-
naments. Plaintiff, whom the court described as having the character's "exact name
coupled with a commonality of physical traits," id., was held'to be entitled to go for-
ward to gather more evidence concerning the identification that reasonable readers
would make.
The novel was written only several months after plaintiff and defendant author had
been co-workers in an office of twenty employees for about six months. As in E. Hul-
ton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20, that would seem to add nothing to the question of
how readers understood the story unless the "reasonable reader" were from the group
of twenty office workers. They might be more likely to find that the author intended to
use the plaintiff's name because they knew the author was acquainted with a person
who had a name identical to the character's. But the office workers would also be more
likely to know that the real person was not a transsexual tournament-level tennis
player. See note 23, supra.
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alone did not show the required "of and concerning" element.26
2. Plaintiff is Not Named
The "of and concerning" question also is presented when the
plaintiff's name is not used in the fictional material, but the
plaintiff claims similarities so great that reasonable readers
would understand that the character was, in fact, the plaintiff.
27
These cases range from those in which the similarities are
beyond any plausible unintentional coincidence 28 to those in
which there well might be serious doubt as to identification.2 9
These two categories--"name used" and "name not used"-
are not hard edged. For example, where an author uses a
name almost identical to plaintiffs but varied by as little as one
letter, a jury may be permitted to find identification more read-
ily than if a totally different name had been used. 0
26. See facts of Davis in note 14, supra and facts of Allen in note 12, supra.
27. Whether the author knows or does not know the plaintiff is irrelevant except to
the extent that readers know about a prior relationship and use that knowledge in
determining the question of identification.
28. In one case, for example, the similarities include the fact that the plaintiff and
the book's character both came from families of thirteen children, in which the third,
fourth and eighth were girls; both were the oldest of the thirteen children and were
twenty-three years old in 1938; the fathers of both were ministers who traveled through
Europe by bus with a family singing group. The court suggests that there were still
further similarities. There also were some obvious dissimilarities. One was Lithua-
nian, the other was said to be Latvian, and the sect of the minister was different. But a
reasonable jury could find that the similarities overwhelmed the obvious dissimilari-
ties. The latent dissimilarities that prompted the defamation action were the book's
assertion that the character "eagerly cooperat[ed] with a Nazi organization for easy
money it paid him and, in frantic pursuit of money, abandon[ed] his father on his
death bed." Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966).
29. A recent and controversial case concerns a leader of a nude encounter therapy
session. The author had attended such a session conducted by the plaintiff. In her
novel following shortly thereafter she used a variety of circumstances and language
that those familiar with the plaintiff's therapy sessions testified they could identify as
being associated with the plaintiff. However, the defendant also drew explicit dissimi-
larities, e.g., the character had a totally different name, different physical stature, dif.
ferent facial hair and different academic background. Nonetheless, a jury was allowed.
to conclude that reasonable readers would identify the therapist in the novel as the
plaintiff. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
984 (1979).
See also Wright v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944) (plaintiffs did
not recover where allegedly libelous motion picture based on novel contained different
names, locale and plot elements); Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 205 Misc.
357, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1954), aff'd, 1 A.D.2d 660, 147 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1955) (coincidental
use of name of defendant's business on fictional gambler's office door during television
program could not sustain libel action).
30. For example, in one case the author used the name "Cornigan" to identify a
New York City magistrate who was alleged to be a corrupt individual. The plaintiff
LITERATURE AND LIBEL
B. Other Common Law Elements
1. Defamatory Statement
Once the plaintiff in a fiction case has been able to surmount
the "of and concerning" element of the case, essentially he has
won his lawsuit." In virtually none of the fiction cases has the
plaintiff had difficulty showing that the language used had
harmed plaintiff's reputation. This should not be surprising
because authors writing what purports to be fiction are likely
to develop characters whose flaws are explicit and not require
readers to search the text desperately to understand the
characters.
In non-fiction cases, a line of cases has developed in which
the language, although defamatory, is deemed so fantastic or
bizarre that readers would not or could not reasonably take the
claims as being realistic. For example, the United States
Supreme Court concluded as a matter of constitutional law
that a statement in a news article that the plaintiff was trying
to "blackmail" the city council could not reasonably be under-
stood by readers as an assertion that he had committed black-
mail. 2 At most, the article in its context suggested only that
the plaintiff was being a hard bargainer in his dealings with the
city council over a land swap.
Similarly in fiction-defamation cases, it may be that the
plaintiff, although readily identifiable, cannot show that read-
ers could plausibly accept the defamatory assertions as fact
even though probably "of and concerning" a real person.3
Even though some facts may serve to identify the plaintiff, the
was a New York City magistrate whose name was "Corrigan." The court held that a
jury could find the "of and concerning" element. Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228
N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920).
31. See, e.g., Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 984 (1979).
32. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). See aLso Nat'l
Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (use of pejorative words in labor
dispute not actionable); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 552 P.2d
425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976) (statements that union officers were willing to sacrifice
union members' interests to further own ambitions were opinion and not actionable);
but see Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672,
586 P.2d 572, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1978) (substantial fact issue existed whether article
referring to "extortion" and "blackmail" was fact or opinion, thus defendant's motion
for summary judgment could not be granted).
33. The defendant in Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980), may have an
opportunity to make this argument. See note 99, infra. This issue is most likely to
emerge in the context of "faction," discussed at text accompanying notes 96-104, infra.
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facts that may defame plaintiff are different ones that might
not plausibly be understood as describing how the plaintiff
might act.
2. Falsity34
If the material is "of and concerning" the plaintiff and is
found to be defamatory, it is almost certainly going to be false.
The defendant is unlikely to admit suddenly that the fiction
was thinly veiled and that in fact the story was true. Although
there is no legal barrier to such a defense, it has not emerged,
and it might be thought to hopelessly undercut the author's en-
tire defense. Thus, it would be a fortuitous coincidence if the
defendant subsequently were able to present evidence show-
ing truth, that is, that this previously unanticipated plaintiff
had, in fact, done the defamatory things attributed to the
fictional character.
3. Damages
Because the character flaws are almost always explicitly
drawn by the author, the courts have rarely been presented
with a problem of libel per quod-statements not clear on the
face of the publication-for which some states in some cases
require proof of special damages.35
4. Privilege
The availability of privilege at common law has been a com-
plex and confused subject. 6 For our purposes, however, the
common law courts never contemplated a privilege that pro-
34. At common law, the falsity of defamatory material was presumed, while the
defendant had the burden of proving truth as an affirmative defense. This may have
been changed by Supreme Court rulings that the plaintiff must show fault on the
defendant's part. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 581A comment a, 613 caveat
(1977). It is unclear today where the burden lies on the falsity question. Id. But see
Wilson v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371, 374-76 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, - U.S. -, cert. dismissed, - U.S. - (1981) (private person libel plaintiff has
burden of proof on falsity issue since falsity is element of fault which must be proved,
not presumed).
35. The point is that the author is likely to draw each character fully within the
four corners of the material, so that any outside reference is unnecessary. This
removes one of the major stumbling blocks that has thwarted plaintiffs under state law
in defamation cases. Since most cases involve libel, the special damages rules of slan-
der are not likely to have much effect in this area. But see Cal. Civ. Code §§ 46, 48a, 48.5
(West 1982) (broadcast defamations are slander).
36. See W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 115, at 785-96 (4th ed. 1971).
[Vol. 4
No. 2] LITERATURE AND LIBEL
tected fictitious speech. 7 All the privileges involved efforts to
communicate what the speaker asserted as truthful informa-
tion to another person. Even the privileges that the common
law gave to the media-fair report and fair comment-applied
only to communications that purported to be truthful.38
5. Summary
The result, then, is that at common law the plaintiff had one
substantial hurdle-the "of and concerning" element. Plain-
tiffs who could surmount that obstacle were unlikely to con-
front any other serious impediment to a damage recovery in a
fiction-defamation action.
III
The Need for More Protection
A. Constitutional Developments
The protection the common law accorded authors of what
purports to be fiction was quite limited, essentially revolving
around the single issue of "of and concerning." Although it
might be argued that authors of fiction fared no worse than did
authors of non-fiction at common law,39 that fact resolves noth-
ing today for two reasons. First, this society may have a
heightened view of the importance of fiction that warrants in-
creasing the available protection to fiction regardless of how it
treats non-fiction. ° Second, since 1964 courts have provided a
constitutional level of protection to reportorial defamation
37. See Note, supra note 6, at 582-83; Wilson, supra note 6, at -. [notes 112-21]
38. Professor Silver suggests that the fair comment privilege should be used to
protect "faction" since "the author describes opinions" in such works. Silver, supra
note 6, at 1086. This is true particularly since "faction" involves public figures as char-
acters, and the "expansion of fair comment to its outermost boundaries" has occurred
here, "the edges of fair comment hav[ing] become blurred in cases involving public
figures . . ." Id. at 1090-91.
Professor Wilson notes that the minority fair comment rule, which was the predeces-
sor of the New York Times rule and was exemplified by Coleman v. MacLennan, 78
Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) (statement regarding political issues made without malice
was privileged even if untrue and derogatory to plaintiff's character), granted protec-
tion even if not supported totally by actual fact. It was this requirement that made it
difficult to apply fair comment to fiction under the majority rule. Wilson, supra note 6,
at -. [notes 112-16].
39. See notes 2, 8 & 9, supra.
40. See, e.g., J. SARTRE, WHAT Is LITERATURE? (B. Frechtman trans. 1949); F.
LEAVIS, THE GREAT TRADITION (1954); N. FRIEDMAN, FoRM AND MEANING IN FICTION
(1975).
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which has not been explicitly developed for fiction.41 Although
we address the first reason, we rely more heavily on the consti.
tutional development. Additional protection for fiction could
be formulated as a matter of state common or statutory law, or
even state constitutional law under the state provisions for
freedom of expression,42 but we will discuss the matter under
federal constitutional law because most debate has occurred in
analogies drawn from federal constitutional law.
In 1964 in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the United
States Supreme Court held that state defamation law, insofar
as it permitted the imposition of strict liability for defamatory
error of fact in discussion about the conduct of elected public
officials, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. The Court's basic arguments were,
first, that sooner or later errors would find their way into de-
bate over such officials' conduct and, second, that strict liability
for defamatory error in such debates was likely to inhibit dis-
cussion of important public issues. The Court concluded that a
public official suing for defamation needed to show that the au-
thors knew that their defamatory statement about the plaintiff
was false or that they published it recklessly without regard to
whether it might be true or false. Later, the Court extended
this burden to "public figures."
In 1974 the United States Supreme Court again rejected
strict liabilitym-this time for suits brought by "private persons"
against "publishers or broadcasters."4 In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,46 the Court decided not to proceed on a "case-by-
case basis" to balance the publishers' or broadcasters' needs
against the individual's claim to compensation based on the
specific defamatory facts of the story and on the specific iden-
tity of the plaintiff:
[T]his approach would lead to unpredictable results and un-
41. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
42. See, e.g., Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514
(1981).
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
44. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130
(1967).
45. It is an unresolved question whether non-media defendants can be held
strictly liable for defamations against "private persons." See Stuempges v. Parke, Da-
vis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257-58 (Minn. 1980) (Gertz inapplicable to non-media defend-
ants, but discusses split among states).
46. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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certain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise
the lower courts unmanageable. Because an ad hoc resolution
of competing interests at stake in each particular case is not
feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general application.
Such rules necessarily treat alike various cases involving dif-
ferences as well as similarities. Thus it is often true that not all
of the considerations which justify adoption of a given rule will
obtain in each particular case decided under its authority.4 7
The Gertz majority then rejected strict liability as too bur-
densome on the media. In addition to the remedies available
under the New York Times rule, private plaintiffs could recover
"actual injury damages"48 if they could prove that the pub-
lisher or broadcaster had negligently published a false defama-
tory statement.
B. Less Protection for Fiction?
The immediate question is whether this protection for mass
media defendants extends to authors and publishers of fiction.
Whatever limitations the Court implied by its use of "publish-
ers or broadcasters" in Gertz,49 publishers and broadcasters of
fictional material meet the test precisely because they are
"publishers" and "broadcasters." Beyond that, given the
Court's continued reluctance to evaluate the merits of particu-
lar kinds of speech, 0 it is highly unlikely that the Court would
explicitly relegate the entire category of fiction to a level below
the entire category of allegedly truthful materials published in
newspapers, particularly since the Gertz broad-rule approach
seems to protect gossip columns and similar material."'
47. Id. at 343-44.
48. Id. at 349-50.
49. "The principal issue ... is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes
defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public
figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by
those statements." Id. at 332.
50. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) ("We doubt the wisdom
of committing this task [determining "which publications address issues of 'general or
public interest' and which do not"] to the conscience of judges."). But see the plurality
opinions in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding ordi-
nance allowing regulation of "adult" entertainment through zoning laws) and Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (allowing
FCC regulation of broadcasts found "indecent" under 18 U.S.C. § 1464).
51. "Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each par-
ticular [libel] case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general applica-
tion." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974).
Arguably, applying a negligence test to a defamation arising from gossip is much less
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The only plausible argument for relegating the entire domain
of fiction to a level of protection lower than that accorded to
non-fiction is to be found in the writing of those who see First
Amendment protection as applying uniquely to political
speech. Some commentators argue that the First Amendment
should protect only speech of a "political" nature.52 Such a
view presumably would lead to a general conclusion that all
fiction, no matter how elevating, no matter what lessons it
seeks to teach by indirect and allegorical techniques, is simply
not protected speech because it is not explicit political dis-
course. This view has not persuaded the Supreme Court.5 3 In-
deed, even the view's earliest major advocate, Alexander
Meiklejohn, altered his position substantially.54
C. Greater Protection for Fiction?
If fiction is unlikely to be exposed to the strict liability ap-
proach that it is no longer constitutionally permitted in defa-
mation cases involving non-fiction, the question arises whether
it should be granted a level of protection greater than the
United States Supreme Court now requires for non-fiction
communication by mass media.
The primary argument the Court has developed to justify de-
nying total protection to deliberately false speech (but which
defensible than applying it to one arising from fiction. See text accompanying notes
76-90, infra, for discussion of negligence applied to fiction.
52. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (only reason to give more protection to speech than other activities is
need for "discovery and spread of political truth" through speech dealing "explicitly
and specifically and directly with politics and government"); BeVier, The First Amend-
ment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30
STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978) (The First Amendment "in principle protects only 'political'
speech-speech that participates in the processes of representative democracy,"'
though to achieve this end may require "extending first amendment protection to cate-
gories of speech other than the strictly political.").
53. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948): "We do not accede to [the]
suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposi-
tion of ideas. The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right .... What is one man's amusement, teaches another's
doctrine."
54. Compare A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT (1948) (advocating absolute protection for "political speech," but protection for
"private speech" only through due process clause of Fifth Amendment) with
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 257 (including
"education," "philosophy and the sciences," "literature and the arts" and "public dis.-




is purported to be true) emerged in Garrison v. Louisiana.55
There, the Court suggested that it would be inappropriate to
grant absolute constitutional privilege to deliberately false
speech for two reasons. First, "the use of the known lie as a
tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic govern-
ment and with the orderly manner in which economic, social,
or political change is to be effected. ' 56 Second, "[c]alculated
falsehood falls into that class of utterances which 'are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.' , These reasons appear to be two dis-
tinct arguments-the first focusing on the political processes
by which change is to be brought about in our political system,
and the second being a commentary on the low social utility of
calculated falsehood in an effort to obtain "truth."
If the reasons in Garrison for the denial of absolute privilege
apply to purportedly non-fiction communications, do they ap-
ply equally to fiction? The question is difficult to answer be-
cause, as most advocates of protection for fiction argue, 8
traditional notions of "truth" and "falsity," or "accuracy" and
"inaccuracy" do not directly apply where an author purports to
be writing fiction. In some cases, the entire piece may be so
fanciful that it is clearly false. 9 In other material, specific
statements may not be "true," but the total picture that the au-
thor seeks to convey is one he claims to be "true."60 Authors
who write fiction, who use these techniques, are not in any way
treading on established notions of public morality or engaging
in impermissible political statements that would justify giving
them less than total protection from liability for defamation.
Does the fact that Garrison does not apply to fiction justify
giving fiction absolute protection? The answer is suggested by
a different look at the New York Times and Gertz cases. In-
55. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
56. Id. at 75.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 6, at 1070-75; Wilson, supra note 6, at - [notes 9-13];
Comment, supra note 6, at 571-72.
59. For example, R. CoovER, THE PUBLIC BURmNG (1976), such genre fiction as
detective stories or science fiction, or certain Donald Barthelme stories.
60. For example, G. VIDAL, JuLuAN (1964) (purported to be a fictionalized depiction
of John F. Kennedy), or even H. MELVILE, MOBY DICK (Norton ed. 1967) (in which
Ahab is thought by some to be based on Andrew Jackson).
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stead of asking why strict liability is not permissible, it might
be asked why absolute privilege should not be granted. In
fiction cases, absolute privilege is inappropriate because the
value to the body politic of that form of speech may be per-
ceived as less clearly established than that of speech ad-
dressed more directly to the conduct of public officials.61 That
is, absolute privilege should not be applied in fiction cases be-
cause the language itself does not cry out for that extreme
level of protection. Indeed, some would argue the type of pub-
lic speech exemplified by that involved in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan does demand that level of protection.62 If such pro-
tection was not granted in the compelling New York Times sit-
uation, it is unlikely that a strong case can be made for
absolute protection of fiction based on the "body politic"
argument.
Another argument for absolute protection is the inherent lit-
erary value of fiction and the social benefits that accrue when
authors are entirely free to conjure up their own images 63 with-
out fear of tort liability. An author operating in a world free
from fear of liability for defamation will be less inhibited than
one operating in an area of even restricted tort liability. This
does not mean, however, that the Constitution should provide
fiction that extraordinary level of protection when it is not pro-
vided to other authors. We would conclude that some tort lia-
bility should be permissible in this area without imposing
inappropriate inhibitions on authors of fiction.
A third argument for absolute privilege is that all readers
will automatically accept an author's assertion that a work is
fiction, so that no real person is defamed or harmed. Some
fiction cases do, however, show that authors of fiction indeed
can damage plaintiffs.64 We are not ready to accept an absolute
61. It also may be questioned whether fiction is as valuable as nonfiction discus-
sion of matters of "general or public interest," although the Supreme Court has re-
fused to adopt that standard in defamation cases. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), with Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
62. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293, 297 (1964) (Black, Doug-
las, & Goldberg, JJ., concurring) (emphasizing importance of both discussion of public
affairs and risk plaintiffs assume in accepting positions as public officials).
63. See, e.g., A Defense of Poetry, 7 THE WORKS OF PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY 98 (H.
Forman ed. 1880); M. ARNOLD, LECTURES AND ESSAYS IN CRITICISM (R. Super ed. 1962);
Nobel Prize Address, COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM FAULKNER 3 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1959);
E. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL (1927); F. LEAVIS, THE GREAT TRADITION (1948).
64. E.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980); Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260
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rule preventing recovery for these otherwise compensable
losses. Despite the fanciful nature of fiction, the harm to repu-
tation can be just as real as in non-fiction. Concern for inhibi-
tion on authors of fiction does not outweigh the need to
compensate at least some of these cases.6"
Even those commentators who have argued strongly in favor
of absolute privilege for fiction have built into their analyses a
safety valve for cases that a jury might find were "sham"
fiction, thinly veiled efforts to put into fiction what the author
obviously intended as an attack on a clearly identifiable human
being.66
IV
An Approach to Liability in Fiction-Defamation
Cases
A. Introduction
Based on the foregoing considerations, we conclude that
fiction is different in purpose and construction from non-fiction
expression and that these differences justify distinctive legal
treatment but that absolute privilege is inappropriate. Al-
though we recognize great value in fiction, we are not confident
that it is, or should be treated as, more valuable than other
types of speech. 7 Thus, we are reluctant to permit absolute
protection as long as those who engage in buoyant political
speech and other forms of non-fiction expression have lesser
(1920) (magistrate in New York named Corrigan held to have cause of action where
defendant published novel containing libelous statements about New York magistrate
named "Cornigan"); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Stanley, 56 Ga. App. 85, 192 S.E. 300
(1937).
65. This is subject to the tests discussed infra.
66. Professor Wilson's test, which is quite protective of fiction and depends heavily
on the work being identified as fiction, suggests that the author who intended to de-
fame the plaintiff not be protected. Wilson, supra note 6, at - [notes 143-601.
While Professor Silver suggests viewing a work of "faction" as a whole and, in some
instances, finding that it contains a "message about our national character" thus al-
lowing it to qualify for "legal immunity from liability" through the fair comment privi-
lege, Silver, supra note 6, at 1097, he nonetheless acknowledges that "[tjhis is not to
say that, presented with a libel action, the court's choice should always be for the art-
ist." Id. at 1098.
See also Comment, supra note 6, at 593.
67. It is doubtful whether such a question is even appropriate for the judiciary.
See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in judgment); Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726, 755 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
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privileges and are subject to a variety of expensive and cum-
bersome litigation processes.68
Yet, fiction is demonstrably different from non-fiction, partic..
ularly reportorial communication. First, the author conveys to
his audience that the material is fiction, created from his mind,
and is not to be taken literally. This proposition would suggest
that a plaintiff who appears to be described in a novel has not
been harmed seriously because reasonable readers will take
the author at his word that the content is fictitious-at least
most of the time. The strong presumption is that, in the first
instance, readers of fiction will find coincidence and fortuity
where, in a non-fictional context, they would find identification
and defamation.69
Second, as with all writing, there is an advantage in allowing
the creative mind free rein and imposing legal constraints only
where they clearly serve important countervailing interests.
When an author purports to be telling the truth, it is appropri-
ate for the law to develop a standard that is correlated, at least
to some extent, with the truthfulness of the report. Where the
author contends he is being fanciful, however, there is strong
reason to protect his product of imagination.
The differences between fiction and non-fiction also suggest
the requirement that the plaintiff prove every element of the
lawsuit, including both the traditional common law elements
and constitutional protections, by clear and convincing proof.
70
The justification for this heavy civil burden is that this commu-
nication is a literary form that asserts it is fiction and ought not
to be taken as fact. The burden should be on the plaintiff to
prove that reasonable readers did take the story as being fact
rather than fiction, the defendant thus being "at fault" in per-
mitting this to happen. All "close" cases should be decided in
favor of the author rather than the plaintiff. The jury should
not be permitted to vent anger or otherwise impose legal liabil-
ity on authors of fiction except in the clearest cases of author
misbehavior.7'
68. Also, the counter-example of "sham" starkly suggests the danger of developing
an absolute privilege for fiction. Although it would be possible to provide that fiction
should have an absolute protection subject only to a "sham" exception, granting abso-
lute protection while cutting back on that protection through exceptions defeats the
benefits of total freedom for authors and publishers.
69. See note 81, infra.
70. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
71. This is discussed further at text accompanying notes 72-75, 82, infra.
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We have been unable to reduce to a single statement the sit-
uations in which we would impose liability. Instead, we have
identified four paradigmatic situations in which tort liability
would seem to be acceptable if the plaintiff can prove by clear
and convincing evidence the requisite fault element as well as
all other common law elements. In the discussion that follows,
then, it should be assumed that the plaintiff has shown by clear
and convincing evidence that reasonable readers understood
the fictional character to be the plaintiff and that all other ele-
ments, such as the defamatory nature of the statement and fal-
sity, are also proven with the requisite clarity. With these
hurdles overcome, the question becomes what more the plain-
tiff should be required to prove in order to establish liability in
fiction cases.
The four situations identified are not analytically discrete.
Three involve situations in which the defendant-author knew
the plaintiff personally or knew about the plaintiff. The ques-
tion is how the description of the fictional character came to be
understood as the plaintiff. The fourth situation involves an
author who had never known, or known of, the particular plain-
tiff but who, in creating what he honestly believed to be a total-
ly fictitious character, in fact described an existing human
being so closely that reasonable readers concluded that the
material was about the plaintiff. Each of these situations will
be analyzed for the requisite "fault" element.
B. When Liability is Appropriate
1. The "Sham" Case
For the plaintiff to prove that the author's "real" purpose was
to veil an attack on plaintiff, the jury must conclude, based on
clear and convincing evidence, that the author deliberately in-
tended that readers take one of his "fictional" characters as the
plaintiff. The plaintiff's name need not have been used.72 In
trying to prove this difficult point, the plaintiff should be able to
72. See Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966). In Fetler the
plaintiff's name was not used, but there would seem to be no difficulty in persuading a
jury that the defendant must have intended those readers who knew the plaintiff's
family situation to understand that the character was the plaintiff. See note 28, supra.
Similarly, in Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920), involving a
character of a corrupt judge, the fact that the character's name was very similar to the
plaintiff's, taken with other identifying similarities, permitted a jury to conclude that




use evidence suggesting that the author and the plaintiff knew
each other and describing the extent of their acquaintance,
that the author had an unpleasant experience with the plaintiff
before the character was created, that the character is depicted
in a way different from others in the work, suggesting the au-
thor deliberately created the similarities, and that earlier
drafts of the manuscript show that the character evolved in a
way different from the evolution of other characters.73
If the plaintiff can prove the author intended to defame him
and can prove the other requisite elements, the case would
seem analogous to the deliberate falsity standard set forth in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.7 The behavior in question
appears as socially unrewarding as that required in New York
Times, or even more so. In New York Times the defendants
purported to state as fact the behavior of an elected public offi-
cial. In a "sham" fiction case, the author does not even purport
to be adding to the reservoir of general knowledge and infor-
mation; rather, he is taking an indirect but transparent route to
defame an individual. When the jury finds that reasonable
readers understood precisely what the author "intended" them
to understand and that the New York Times falsity standard
has been met, there would seem to be no reason to require
more protection than now afforded by New York Times.75
2. The Failed Disguise
In this situation the jury must conclude that the author con-
sciously patterned the fictional character on a real person, but
intended to disguise that person so that plaintiff would not be
able to show by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable!
73. For the approach herein, the purpose of expert witnesses would be to testify as
to how the author drew a character. This is in contrast to expert testimony regarding
the quality of the work. For instance, Professor Wilson's approach would have expert
witnesses speak to whether the work is fiction. Wilson, supra note 6, at - [notes 142-
43].
74. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
75. The Supreme Court never has held the imposition of punitive damages to be
permissible. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82-86 (1971) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
Some states have gone so far as to bar the imposition of punitive damages in defama-
tion cases. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 288 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777 (1979) (accommodation
of state constitutional provisions guaranteeing "free expression of opinion" and rem-
edy for "injury done [a plaintiff] in his person, property, or reputation" limits compen-
sation for defamation to injury itself, not including punishment or deterrence). See
also Hall v. May Department Stores Co., 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981).
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readers understood the fictional character to be him. When the
author's efforts at disguise fail, the case turns on the reason for
failure. Two explanations may be available, each depending on
the kind of plaintiff involved: a prominent plaintiff or an ordi-
nary citizen.
(a) Prominent Plaintiff
A fictional character may be so distinctive and drawn from
such a limited pool of real people that no effort at disguise
could be totally successful. Examples of such characters are a
television network news anchorman or a famous athlete with
certain physical or other well-known qualities. To generalize,
prominent plaintiffs can include almost any person frequently
in the public eye."
In such cases, the author should be protected unless the
plaintiff can show by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant has recklessly failed to take steps to prevent reader
identification.77 Though it might be argued that the author
should be required to exercise at least due care to disguise all
plaintiffs, we are concerned that the jury will be so influenced
by the failure that it will conclude there must not have been
due care. We fear that juries will not pay sufficient attention to
the great difficulty of disguising a character in this type of case.
It is enough that an author, who necessarily must be aware of
the similarities at the general level because of the prominence
of the model, try to introduce at least a few dissimilarities.
Some attention is all that appropriately can be required.
With a more rigorous test, authors might decide that some
prominent role types are out-of-bounds as subjects of fiction-
at least if presented negatively-because the risk of litigation
will be too great. Where the author has made a good faith at-
tempt at disguise, the prominent plaintiff must take the risk
that the disguise will fail.78
76. This is not meant to be a "public figure" as defined in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351 (1974) ("an individual ... is drawn into a particular public
controversy and thereby.becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues").
Rather, it is intended to be any well known person, no matter how prominence was
attained.
77. If the author has recklessly failed to take even minimal steps to disguise, the
approach should be analogous to the reckless disregard standard of New York Times.
78. Thus, if the author can prove he exerted some effort to disguise the plaintiff,
summary judgment or directed verdict at trial would be appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ.




Frequently an author models a character on someone who is
not prominent in public life, but rather is an ordinary citizen
who at one time crossed paths with the author, such as a for-
mer college classmate, co-worker, or neighbor. In this situa-
tion, the author has drawn on a relatively anonymous citizen
but has failed to disguise the plaintiff adequately either by pro-
viding too much similarity or by introducing too little
dissimilarity.79
Here, it seems appropriate to utilize a test comparable to
that in Gertz. Should a reasonable author have realized that
more needed to be done to prevent the reasonable reader from
identifying the fictional character with the actual plaintiff? The
plaintiff who, by clear and convincing evidence, shows this
kind of negligence on the author's part, should prevail.8 0 If suc-
cessful, the plaintiff should then recover special but not actual
damages.81 It is not too burdensome a duty to expect an author
to determine reasonably whether he sufficiently has disguised
79. In this kind of case the damages may be small because relatively few readers
will know enough similarities to identify this relatively anonymous person. On the
other hand, where the mass of reasonable readers would make such an identification,
the nature of the defamation may be such that plaintiff would suffer serious harm.
80. The Supreme Court did not specify the standard of proof it would require
under the Gertz test beyond "competent evidence." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974). However, Justice Brennan suggests the standard might not be
clear and convincing evidence: "The accommodation that this Court has established
between free speech and libel laws in cases involving public officials and public
figures-that defamatory falsehood be shown by clear and convincing evidence to have
been published with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth-is not
apt, the Court holds, because the private individual does not have the same degree of
access to the media ... as does the public person and he has not voluntarily exposed
himself to public scrutiny." Id. at 362-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. We believe the protection needed by authors of fiction requires an approach to
damages analogous to, but nonetheless different from, that of Gertz, in which the
Supreme Court stated that its purpose in allowing actual injury damages and prohibit-
ing general and punitive damages in the absence of actual malice was to prevent juries
from assessing damages "in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary rela-
tion to the actual harm caused" and to remove their power "to use their discretion
selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
At least one fiction-defamation case shows this policy is not always effectuated. In
Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., C. 79-251 (D. Wyo. Feb. 20, 1981), appeal filed,
No. 81-1480 (10th Cir. 1981), a jury awarded a $26.5 million judgment ($25 million in
punitive damages) against the publisher and $35,000 ($25,000 in punitive damages)
against the author for a story about a Miss Wyoming's sexual exploits. The trial court
reduced the punitive damages to $12,525,000, but did not disturb the jury's award of
$1.51 million in actual injury damages, based on the plaintiff's claim of "humiliation
and embarrassment and mortification." Brief for Appellee at 14, Pring v. Penthouse
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an ordinary person so that reasonable readers will not associ-
ate him with the character.
8 2
3. The Forgotten Plaintiff
Here we deal with situations in which the author once knew,
or knew of, the plaintiff but claims to have forgotten him. If the
jury finds the requisite identification, we may conclude that
the author, although thinking he was creating a character, was
drawing heavily on his earlier recollections of the plaintiff. The
International, Ltd., C. 79-251 (D. Wyo. Feb. 20, 1981), appealfiled, No. 81-1480 (10th Cir.
1981).
To the contrary, the publishers of a parody of a well-known children's book involving
Eloise, referred to a character as a "child molester," not realizing that the character
being satirized from the original book was based on a real person. That person was
unable to sustain a defamation action because of failure to prove actual damages,
which in New York do not include "mental anguish unaccompanied by loss of reputa-
tion." Salomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co., 77 A.D.2d 501, 502, 429 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443
(1980).
Such variability of results under the "actual injury damages" rule suggests that reli-
ance on special damages where the defendant is found to be only negligent better com-
ports with the spirit and purpose of the approach presented herein.
In the face of this, we recommend that a finding of negligence based on clear and
convincing evidence, see text accompanying notes 70-71, supra, permit recovery of spe-
cial, not actual injury, damages. States may, of course, choose to apply the more re-
strictive approach of Salomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., supra.
In no negligence case should the defendant be liable for the "actual injury" damages
described by the Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976), an award
based "on elements other than injury to reputation." See Note, Defamation, Privacy
and the First Amendment, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1016.
82. A plaintiff may be able to prove more than negligence. For example, it may be
shown that the defendant author knew disguise was needed but recklessly failed to
provide it. (This is distinguished from the "sham" case, at text accompanying notes 72-
75, supra.) In such a case, the New York Times standard may be applied by analogy
and the plaintiff permitted to recover whatever damages state law would permit.
The reasons for distinguishing between public and private plaintiffs suggested in
Gertz do not seem applicable to fiction. Public persons may have to expect criticism,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), but only through news report-
ing or commentary, not through the medium of fiction. Access to the mass media may
be sufficient to refute accusations made through news and information channels, Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974), but not defamatory comments made in
fiction.
In Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 64, 126 N.E. 260 (1920), Justice Pound
quotes with approval the remarks of historian Goldwin Smith that Disraeli's "veiled
attack upon him as 'The Oxford Professor' in the novel 'Lothair'" was a "'dastardly
... mode of stabbing a reputation.'" Defamation in fiction forces the plaintiff to con-
tend that he recognized himself in the work and then to prove he did not act or speak
in the manner attributed to the fictional character. Thus, were he to attempt to clear
his name through the media, he would be pointing a finger at himself: "Yes, I am that
person described; but, no, I did not act that way." 'Then why," comes the reply, "did
you think it referred to you?" Ultimately, only a lawsuit will vindicate the plaintiff.
This is particularly true of the defamation through "sham" fiction.
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claim is not that a disguise failed-the author did not realize
that disguise was necessary. 3
Tort law has long recognized that the reasonable person is
expected to remember certain things, but also may forget
things with the passage of time.84 The forgotten plaintiff needs
to show that a reasonable author, having encountered the
plaintiff in the manner in which the author had, should have
remembered the plaintiff's existence at the time of creating the
fictional material and thus should have been under the obliga-
tion of reasonable disguise for ordinary citizens.
If the relationship was a fleeting and/or distant one, it would
be difficult to show that a reasonable author would remember.
It would be much easier for a jury to find, with the requisite
convincing clarity, that a reasonable author would remember
plaintiff if they once knew each other well.8" On this basis, the
83. However, the author still may have a duty to make certain checks in readily
accessible directories to determine no real persons exist who have the same names as
the fictional characters. See text accompanying notes 88-90, infra. Assistance with
this task may be available:
[T1 here is at least one service bearing the name of its owner, Kellem de For-
rest Ide Forrest Research Service, Los Angeles], that reviews scripts and will
point out matters that may raise clearance problems. For example, the For-
rest service will verify that addresses, names, telephone numbers and so forth
do not coincide with actual counterparts if the specific locale depicted in the
picture is identifiable, and will verify historical facts.
Barton, Overview: Practical and Legal Approaches to Dealing with Entertainment
Projects Involving Fictional Characters, in Fictional Characters and Real People 216,
28th Annual Program, Legal Aspects of the Entertainment Industry, April 24, 1982 (co-
sponsored by the Beverly Hills Bar Association and the University of Southern Cali-
fornia Law Center).
84. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw Op' TORTS § 16.5, at 910-11 (1956).
85. See, e.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980) (author was co-em-
ployee with plaintiff for six months in 20-person office shortly before novel was writ-.
ten); E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [19101 A.C. 20 ("fictitious" name selected for newspaper
story was same as that of plaintiff, who had written articles for newspaper which pub-.
lished story and was well-known in newspaper's region of distribution).
Perhaps the most curious example is Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F.
Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1976). A journalist attended a
meeting of parents concerned about drug use by the community's young people. The
meeting's organizers were the plaintiff Evelyn Smith and a Mrs. Bowman. During the
meeting the latter spoke of her son's drug problems and after the meeting the reporter
interviewed her. She consented to the interview only if her name was not used in the
story. The reporter wrote the story and inserted the names "Mrs. Smith" and "Randy
Smith." In the third paragraph, nine lines from the top of the story, boldface type
stated that the names were fictitious but the story was true. The plaintiff and her son,
Harold Randall Smith, commonly known as "Randy," sued for defamation. Despite
Mrs. Smith's involvement in the meeting the reporter attended, the court said it "is
uncontroverted that the reporter did not know either Randy Smith or Mrs. Smith, and
that the choosing of those names was merely a coincidence." Id. at 1272. However, the
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burden of remembering acquaintances who serve as models of
a fictional character does not seem too burdensome.
If the trier of fact finds unreasonable failure to remember,
the maximum sanction available under analogy to Gertz would
be special, not actual, damages. No matter how gross the case,
forgetfulness should invoke the Gertz analogy.8 6 It appears un-
likely that a plaintiff in this situation would be able to prove a
reckless failure to remember, since recklessness requires ex-
plicit and conscious aversion to some risk. 7
4. The Accidental Description
In the accidental description case, the author has never met
the plaintiff (and therefore has no reason to forget him), but he
creates a character that bears an uncanny resemblance to an
existing person. Reasonable readers, not knowing how the au-
thor came to create the character, believe that the book is
about the plaintiff. Can any duty of due care be imposed on
authors in this situation that would not be unduly
burdensome?
No case has been found that imposes liability on the author
in this situation, with the possible exception of E. Hulton & Co.
v. Jones.8 In that case the court used what now is clearly an
unacceptable strict liability rationale. But should a modern
court confronted with comparable facts use a negligence stan-
dard or should it deny recovery in the absence of greater mis-
conduct? To say that a plaintiff, who has reasonably been
thought to be identified with a fictional character and who has
suffered special damages, can have no recovery would suggest
that serious harm might befall the plaintiff with no compensa-
tion whatsoever. That result would be tolerable only if imposi-
tion of a duty on the author would unduly burden and inhibit
the creative process.
court also noted that a few months before this story appeared, the same newspaper
"had published some material on Randy." Id. at 1272 n.1. Despite what the court
called "a remarkable set of facts," the plaintiff was unable to prove "of and
concerning."
86. See Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 n.1 (S.D. Ohio
1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1976).
87. While recklessness might be found if a jury finds an author has forgotten a
prominent plaintiff, it is unlikely such a case would arise. It is difficult to prove one
forgot a well-known person; more typically those forgotten are former classmates, co-
workers and neighbors.
88. 11910] A.C. 20.
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Specific, judicially-declared duties in this situation would be
appropriate. Where the author has created a sharply deline-
ated character whose identification with a real person is possi-
ble, the author should have the duty of checking lists or other
readily available directories. For example, if the author places
a character in a particular city and draws that character in a
defamatory way, it is not unduly inhibiting to require a search
of that community's telephone book (but not unlisted tele-
phone numbers) to determine if someone of that name is
listed. Similarly, an author who draws in a defamatory way a
character who is a member of the State Bar of California
should have a duty to make a single check of the roster of law-
yers in that state. 9 It would be negligence for the author to fail
to undertake this readily available checking technique.90
IV
Faction
We consider "faction" separately because it involves a spe.-
cial subset of the problems of fiction. Professor Silver defines
the novel of "faction" as "one that adheres fairly closely to his-
torical fact as a foundation for psychological speculation
about--or 'mythologizing' of-the real persons and events it
describes."'" He suggests that Alex Haley's Roots "may have
spawned the term." The name of the fictional character chosen
is precisely the name of a living human being. Indeed, the au-
thor intends to readers to connect the two.92 Thus, in most fac-
tion cases the key question is not "of and concerning," but
89. This same approach would be required with characters depicted as medical
specialists who are listed on a national registry; political office holders in specified mu-
nicipalities, states or regions; members of specific athletic teams, etc. See Salomone v.
MacMillan Publishing Co., 77 A.D.2d 501, 502, 429 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 (1980) (Kupferman,
J., concurring) ("The defendants made no attempt of any kind to see if there was a Mr.
Salomone at the hotel in question, an easily verifiable matter.")
90. The plaintiff should be able to prove no more than negligence, since it is im-
probable that an author recklessly created what he believed to be a totally mythical
character only to find that such a person existed in the world. The more explicitly the
author delineates the character by using name, address, occupation, residence, city
and state, the greater the likelihood that the character does not reflect on a particular
person. However, if the coincidences all should point to the same person, the likeli-
hood of harm to that person would be very great.
91. Silver, supra note 6, at 1067 n.10.
92. Sometimes the author may want readers to believe the book is about the real
plaintiff; other times a jury may be persuaded that the device is used solely to evoke
the real life person, but that there was no effort to persuade readers that the character
and the real person were the same.
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rather harm to reputation. Even if readers reasonably under-
stand that the named character is the real person bearing that
same name, the case is likely to turn on whether readers rea-
sonably could understand the defamatory passages to be real-
istic, or instead to be so fantastic that specific portions of the
work cannot be taken as realistic.
This situation is comparable to Greenbelt Publishing Associ-
ation in which the Supreme Court ruled that no reasonable
reader could take the word "blackmail" as a charge of a specific
crime because of the context in which the phrase was used.
9 3
In "faction" cases the same line of analysis must be pursued as
to each allegedly defamatory charge, even if the plaintiff
proves the "of and concerning" element.
"Faction" generally has been associated with works using
names of prominent persons, one example being a book en-
titled The Public Burning, by Robert Coover,94 which uses
characters with names such as Richard Nixon, Roy Cohn, and
Irving Kaufman. The book also includes several persons who
were dead by the time of publication, including Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg. Among the scenes depicted is one in which
the character Richard Nixon is shown attempting to seduce
Ethel Rosenberg shortly before her execution. In a second epi-
sode, the Nixon character is said to be sodomized by a charac-
ter called "Uncle Sam." A court might reasonably rule that
even if readers were to identify the character Richard Nixon as
being intended to portray the former President, no reasonable
reader could understand those charges in any literal sense that
would lead to a claim for defamation. If, however, a passage in
such a book indicated, in a way that readers might think plau-
sible or not fantastic, that the character Richard Nixon had se-
duced his secretary or had engaged in some form of
"conventional" private misbehavior, such a question should go
to a jury under the "clear and convincing" standard. The use of
such a standard in these cases might allow a judge to grant
summary judgment because of the plaintiff's inability to
ground any specific defamatory episode in reality.9 5
93. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). See note 32,
supra.
94. R CoovER, THE PUBLIC BURNING (1976). The Silver article, supra note 91, dis-
cusses this book at length.
95. This argument is not unique to "faction," but is available to all forms of fiction.
See text accompanying notes 32-33, supra.
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Although no defamation action has been reported against
Coover, an action has been brought against Penthouse maga-
zine for a story about a Miss Wyoming at the Miss America
contest in which two possible aspects of faction might be rele-
vant.96 First, the Miss America pageant was identified as the
setting for the story. In dismissing the organizer's lawsuit, the
court concluded that although the article-was "of and concern-
ing" the pageant there was no possibility that a jury could find
that anything defamatory had been said about the pageant. 7
The promoters were not said to have encouraged or condoned
the behavior attributed to the Miss Wyoming character.
Second, in the lawsuit by a real former Miss Wyoming who
claimed that she had been identified in the story, the magazine
defended on the ground that this was a form of fiction.9 8 That
is, they denied that they were writing about a real person. In
addition, they asserted that, even if the story was about a real
person, the behavior attributed to the character was so fantas-
tic and physically impossible that no reader could take it liter-
ally and thus no defamation had occurred.99
V
Conclusion
While there are few reported fiction-defamation cases, sev-
eral well-publicized recent decisions have called attention to
this area. Courts have been inconsistent in their rationale for
96. The Pring case arose from a story published by defendant magazine about a
Miss Wyoming who was able to levitate those upon whom she performed fellatio. In
part, the character was depicted as being a baton twirler and wearing a blue evening
gown in the competition. Prior to writing the story, the defendant author had attended
a Miss America contest in Atlantic City, N.J., at which the plaintiff was a contestant as
Miss Wyoming, performed as a baton twirler and wore a blue evening gown. See Brief
for Appellants at 3-4; Brief for Appellee at 1-6, Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., C.
79-251 (D. Wyo. Feb. 20, 1981), appealfiled, No. 81-1480 (10th Cir. 1981). See note 69,,
supra.
97. Miss America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280
(D.N.J. 1981).
98. The jury, finding large punitive damages, must have concluded that more than
carelessness was involved.
99. A similar defense might have been reached in Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636
(2d Cir. 1980), involving the character of a transsexual tournament tennis player. Al.
though the defendant in the case had not yet had occasion to indicate how he came to
use the precise name of someone he had known previously, one possible defense
might have been that the book was about a real named person but that the charge was




deciding such cases. To enable authors and publishers to bet-
ter understand their duties to potential plaintiffs who claim to
find defamations in fictional material and to aid courts in better
explaining their decisions, we have proposed a method of ad-
ding the constitutional requirement of "fault" to the common
law defamation elements that previously dominated fiction-
defamation cases. Rejecting the polar arguments that authors
of fiction should be strictly liable for defamatory statements
contained therein or should enjoy absolute protection from
defamation suits, we identified four situations in which liabil-
ity for defamation seems appropriate without unduly interfer-
ing with the author's need for creative freedom.
Fiction is an important form of expression, neither more nor
less important than nonfiction. While the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to protecting nonfiction in New York Times and Gertz
cannot be applied directly to fiction, its spirit suggests a way to
offer protection to authors of fiction while, in appropriate cases,
compensating those injured by that material.
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